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Abstract. Neither of the two anonymisation services Tor and AN.ON
clearly outperforms the other one. AN.ON’s user-perceived QoS is gen-
erally more consistent over time than Tor’s. While AN.ON’s network
latencies are low compared to Tor, it suffers from limitations in band-
width. Interestingly, Tor’s performance seems to depend on the time of
day: it increases in the European morning hours. Utilising AN.ON’s re-
porting of concurrently logged-in users, we show a correlation between
load and performance. The reported number of users should be adjusted,
though, so that it serves as a better indicator for security and perfor-
mance. Finally, the results indicate the existence of an overall tolerance
level for acceptable latencies of approximately 4 seconds, which should
be kept in mind when designing low-latency anonymisation services.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Several anonymisation services for low-latency communication have grown up
from research projects recently: among them are the well-known systems AN.ON
[3] and Tor [17]. This paper focuses on the performance of the services for web
surfing from a user perspective.
Although AN.ON and Tor are based on common building blocks (e. g. so called
mixes [6], which relay multiply encrypted traffic from a client to a server), they
differ in various technical attributes such as structure, threat model and appli-
cation range. AN.ON uses a limited set of cascades, each consisting of predefined
mixing nodes. In contrast, Tor relies on a large amount of nodes from which ran-
dom circuits are constructed in real-time. As the user base is usually hundreds
or thousands of times bigger than the amount of nodes used for relaying traffic,
performance issues may arise.
It has been shown that performance, especially latency, is an anonymity-
relevant parameter [11]. We can assume that many users are not able to evaluate
the real security of an anonymisation service [5]. Therefore, their decision to
use a specific service may highly depend on its overall performance: Only few
people are willing to use a slow service, and, regardless of any sophisticated
cryptographical techniques, such a service might not provide any anonymity at
all. Consequently, the performance from a user perspective might serve as an
important indicator for the overall quality. Moreover, performance evaluations
can be used to identify characteristics of the different approaches, and – obviously
– they allow the evaluation of tuning measures.
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In this paper, we will provide an empirical study regarding the relation be-
tween performance and the number of concurrent users. Based on that we will
present the results of a comparison of AN.ON and Tor from a user perspective
and try to explain the source of any differences found. We will show that a na¨ıve
comparison of average throughputs and delays is hardly sufficient, but conclu-
sions can be drawn with the help of inferential statistics nevertheless. Our results
indicate the existence of an overall performance threshold. This means that users
are not willing to use a service which fails to meet this threshold.
We will introduce the evaluation scenarios for our performance tests in sec-
tion 2 and present our methodology for data collection in section 3. Section 4
contains a short description of the statistical methods used during analysis. The
results of our evaluation of AN.ON and Tor are presented in section 5. We suggest
areas for future research in section 6, while section 7 summarizes our findings.
2 Performance Indicators and Evaluation Scenarios
In this section we will present the relevant performance indicators and our eval-
uation scenarios. For the performance evaluation of the anonymisation services,
we simulate the behaviour of a typical WWW-user who (1) requests web sites
and (2) downloads files. We identified two performance indicators, namely la-
tency and bandwidth.
The bandwidth (KBytes/s) indicates how fast data packets may be transmit-
ted on a communication channel. The latency (milliseconds) corresponds to the
roundtrip time of a network packet. Ideally, the latency is independent from the
bandwidth. For large files it is almost irrelevant, whereas retrieving a web site
(with many small objects) can be slowed down by high latencies substantially.
In order to profile the aforementioned indicators, we set up different scenarios.
A scenario is characterised by two parameters: type of simulation and URL lan-
guage. The type of simulation is either (1) a test with different web sites contain-
ing a (large) number of small objects {WEB}, or (2) a test with fixed-size down-
loads {DL}. The separation into different URL languages is a heuristic method
to measure system performance in a local area, e. g. Germany, or world-wide. For
our research, we split the tests into German {DE} and English {EN} content
language. While the English pages can be used for a fair comparison of different
anonymisers, the German sites allow profiling the AN.ON service from a local
perspective.1 The URLs were chosen from the most popular web sites accord-
ing to Alexa [2] and the downloads according to downloads.de/downloads.com
respectively (cf. table 7). Table 1 lists the basic scenarios.
3 Data Collection Methodology
In this section we will describe our methodology for collecting performance
data from anonymisation services based on an example of the Tor network and
1 All current AN.ON servers reside in Germany, whereas Tor is distributed throughout
the world.
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Table 1. General attributes of the basic scenarios
Simulation WEB DL
Language DE EN DE EN
Total URLs / scenario 11 14 3 3
Average requests / scenario 398 309 3 3
Average requests / URL 33.17 20.6 1 1
Average KBytes / scenario 1267 987 1520 1702
Average KBytes / URL 105.58 65.8 506.67 567.33
AN.ON. We will start off with an overview of our evaluation setup and the
evaluated services. The major part of this section will present our data quality
measures.
3.1 Test Suite Overview
There are some free tools available to measure proxy or server performance
[10,15]. Unfortunately, they proved not suitable for the evaluation of anonymisa-
tion services. They focus on other applications and consequently lack important
features such as failure tolerance. In the end, we decided to write a test suite
specifically designed to meet our needs.
As we evaluate the services from a user perspective, the two performance
parameters mentioned, bandwidth and latency, cannot be determined exactly:
There are too many influences not under our control. Therefore, we approxi-
mate the performance of the services with the help of the two observable param-
eters throughput and initial delay. The throughput is calculated by dividing the
amount of received bytes by the time needed for the data transmission. The ini-
tial delay is the time difference between sending the HTTP request and receiving
the first chunk of the response.
Our test suite perfeval2 is written in Perl (about 2.500 lines of code)3. The
scripts retrieve a set of URLs via HTTP (non-recursively) and calculate through-
put and initial delay for each HTTP request. All recorded data of a session is
aggregated into a test case.
We utilise the Perl library LWP::ParallelUA [12] which can handle simultane-
ous connections. Thus, we are able to simulate the behaviour of a web browser:
First, perfeval downloads the HTML page, and then it fetches all the embedded
objects in parallel. In order to prevent proxies or web caches from influencing
the results we send a Cache-Control:no-cache HTTP header [14] along with the
request.
2 We were running the test suite on two WindowsXP workstations with ActivePerl
v5.8.7.815 [1]. The workstations were connected to the Internet directly and had
public IP addresses.
3 http://www.jondos.de/downloads/perfeval.zip
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3.2 Scope of the Evaluation
Table 2 lists the three services we evaluated with perfeval. In the rest of this
paper we will refer to them with the presented acronyms. We also use a control
connection (DIRECT) for assessing the performance of the Internet connection
used during testing.
Table 2. Evaluated systems
DIRECT Direct web access without any proxy
TOR Tor client v0.1.0.16, Privoxy v3.0.3
DD AN.ON cascade Dresden-Dresden (JAP v00.05.078)
CCC AN.ON cascade Regensburg-CCC (JAP v00.05.078)
Privoxy was configured with the option toggle 0 in order to disable all of its
filtering rules. The two mentioned AN.ON cascades were chosen because of high
stability and high number of users at the time when we started the test.4 The
test run started on February 15 2006, 6:00 p.m., and ended on February 26 2006,
11:59 a.m. (both Berlin local time 5) by manual interruption. Thus, we got test
data for 10 complete days and 18 hours, that corresponds to 258 hour-based
test cases for each combination of scenario parameters and tested systems. We
therefore have 4128 test cases altogether.
For the scope of this article an individual web site or a file download is rep-
resented by its URL. Each URL may lead to a number of HTTP requests: Typ-
ically, a web sit causes additional requests (for the HTML page and all its em-
bedded objects), whose number typically differs over time, whereas a download
causes exactly one HTTP request.
3.3 Data Quality Measures
In order to get statistically utilisable results for measuring the tested services,
the collected data should not be considerably influenced by
(a) external factors jeopardizing the validity of the test cases like downtimes of
the network, downtimes and failures of services, HTTP errors reported by
web sites, and errors in the evaluation software itself,
(b) bias introduced by the observation itself like concurrent tests on the same
anonymisation service, concurrent test requests of the same resource, and
performance fluctuations on the computer where the test software runs,
(c) influences through fluctuations during the test like performance fluctuations
of requested resources and fluctuations of the total amount of requested
data,
4 At that time the remaining two AN.ON cascades were used for testing purposes only,
and were neither stable in structure nor in code.
5 Note that Germany has one single time zone.
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(d) performance tampering through HTTP redirects,
(e) performance limit introduced by the Internet conection,
(f) varying performance throughout the day.
These influences have to be mitigated before and during the test. After that,
the collected data must be examined for influences by the aforementioned factors.
If at least one of those has a non-negligible influence, the corresponding data is
probably not usable for any statistical analysis. We assume an influence as non-
negligible if the ratio of (possibly influencing) “critical” cases to “good” cases is
higher than 5%.6
In short, we found that our test data is of high quality regarding these mea-
sures. A more detailed description of our approach to measure data quality is
presented in the following sections.
External factors. Single erroneous test cases resulting from a bad implemen-
tation of the test software may be discovered by looking for extreme values in
the number of HTTP requests (which should be the same for each test case),
the initial delay and the throughput.
HTTP errors, service failures, network and service downtimes may lead to
missing or unintentionally influenced cases. For each unsuccessful HTTP request
(i. e., the status code of the HTTP indicates a failure), we have to determine
whether the source of the problem is the webserver or the network (i. e., the
anonymisation service or the Internet connection). We will refer to the former as
errors, to the latter as failures. This differentiation is important to measure the
“quality” of an anonymisation service. Our software implements a sophisticated
algorithm to differentiate errors from failures:
An unsuccessful HTTP request will be flagged as an error, if all of the following
conditions apply immediately after the HTTP response has been received:
– a connection to the webserver/proxy can be established successfully
– a HTTP test request can be sent over the network
– a corresponding HTTP response is received
– the HTTP status code is not 200 OK (or something similar)
– the HTTP status code is not 502 Service temporarily overloaded, or 503
Gateway timeout
Otherwise, the unsuccessful request is probably a failure, but further exami-
nations are necessary. This is especially true for responses with status codes 502
and 503, which can be issued by the webserver as well as by the proxy server. If
the webserver is the originator, the request should be flagged as error, otherwise
as failure. Timeouts, i. e., delays exceeding 60 seconds, are the most common
type of failures.
Table 8 lists the number of cases missing either due to software errors or
because of network or service downtimes. Compared to the total number in the
6 Note that this is a heuristic approach. The quality measures are ratios and not
probabilities as in statistical tests.
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sample, they are negligible. It also shows that almost all failures occur for DD,
but as less than 5% of all requests are affected, we still treat external influences as
negligible. This finding indicates hardware or network problems on the AN.ON
DD cascade, though. Its operators have not been aware of that until now.
The number of errors is uncritical for all but one case: the error ratio on
the CCC cascade for English downloads is about 9%. That means that a lot
of downloads were skipped, probably due to service-specific blockings by the
web site operators (e. g. by blacklisting the IP of the last mix of the cascade).
Nevertheless, this influence is limited to reducing the sample size for this service.
Bias introduced by the observation itself. The tests for web surfing /
downloads together were composed to be completed in less than 30 minutes for
each language. In order to force comparable and periodic hour-of-day-based time
intervals from 0 to 23 (Berlin local time), we put a hard limit of 60 minutes on
the total duration of a language test. For each test case, all URLs were processed
sequentially so that no interference between them was possible7. As the DE and
EN tests should not interfere with each other, we performed these test cases on
two separate machines, the latter one starting with a time offset of 30 minutes.
Figure 1 shows the course of events during the performance evaluation.
Table 8 shows that the hard limit of one hour was never reached in our exper-
iment and that a 30-minute-overlapping did not occur more often than in 5% of
the test cases. These influences are therefore not seen as critical.
time
DE
EN
DIRECT AN.ONDD
AN.ON
CCC TOR
00:00:00 00:30:00
DIRECT AN.ONDD
AN.ON
CCC TOR
01:00:00
DIRECT AN.ONDD
typically <30 minutes hard limit for DE cycle #1 
DE cycle #1 DE cycle #2
EN cycle #1
...
individual
perfeval.pl sessions
Fig. 1. Test sequence for performance evaluation
Influences through performance fluctuations. In order to avoid perfor-
mance influences from slow web servers that could lead to wrong conclusions in
the analysis, the measurements of the individual URLs are aggregated into one
test case for each scenario. Accordingly, we do not try to evaluate the service
7 Note that HTTP requests for each requested web site are done concurrently, but
this is what a typical web browser would do as well.
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performance regarding single URLs (although this would be possible with our
result files, of course).
Another possible influence is related to the amount of data received in each
test case. To make the cases of one scenario comparable, they should be of
equal size. We compared the median and the interquartile range8 (IQR) of the
downloaded bytes for each service with the median and IQR of all services to
analyse this influence.
Table 8 shows that the ratios of all medians are negligible. Although there are
some problems with English downloads (causing a huge IQR ratio for the CCC
cascade), they do not affect the median. Therefore, our analysis suggests that
we have indeed collected similar amounts of data for the different services.
Note that measuring performance fluctuations within the infrastructure of the
anonymisation service is beyond the scope of this paper. In particular, we are
not trying to measure the performance of individual nodes or one anonymity
service as a whole. For Tor, we have to trust the node selection algorithm of its
client software – we are looking at performance from a user perspective after all.
HTTP redirects. Our evaluation software honours HTTP 301 and 302 redi-
rect status codes. Although this behaviour is necessary for the imitation of a web
browser, it introduces a new challenge: Our test might be influenced by server-
side redirects (geolocation), which would undermine the geographic separation
introduced by the URL language scenario parameter.
It is rather difficult to rule out this influence completely as we cannot con-
trol the behaviour of the web servers. Of course, our software does not send any
Accept-Language headers which would give away any information about its lo-
cation or preferred language, nor does it interpret JavaScript code in the HTML
pageswhich could be used to query language-specific browser attributes. But there
are still more sophisticated ways for geolocation, for example by querying the
WHOIS database for the IP address of the sender of the HTTP request. Obviously,
it is impossible to fully prevent a webserver from delivering adapted versions of the
requested content to the client. It has been observed that Tor (with its world-wide
network of exit nodes) is subject to this phenomenon [18]. We screened the eval-
uation data to make sure that no geolocation was employed, though.
Note that language adaption is not as big a problem as it seems. HTTP
requests which are automatically being redirected to a server located in close
vicinity of the client are a far more intriguing threat. We have examined the
URLs for the [EN] scenario and could not find any indication that this form of
redirection was employed by any web site. Of course, some sites utilise round
robin DNS entries in order to distribute the load on several webservers (e. g.
google.com). But such procedures shouldn’t affect the performance evaluation
because their influence is averaged by the large amount of test cases.
Performance limit introduced by the Internet connection. If the local
area network suffers from performance fluctuations, it may influence the observed
8 The interquartile range is the difference of the upper 75% and the lower 25% quartile.
It is a robust measure for the standard deviation of frequencies.
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I(St) =
{
0 if Thcrit(St) ≥ 0, small or no influence
1 if Thcrit(St) < 0, possible high influence
w.r.t
Thcrit(St) = Th(DIRECTt) − Th(St) −
IQRB(DIRECT)
2
where
S ∈ {DIRECT, TOR, DD, CCC}
t := time (day and hour)
St := test case of S at the time t
IQRB(DIRECT) := Interquartile range of throughput of DIRECT
Th(St) := measured throughput of St
Thcrit(St) := critical throughput of St
I(St) := possible influence of DIRECT on St
Fig. 2. Evaluating performance influences of the network connection
data as well. Network-caused performance breaks in all systems could be mis-
interpreted as a common attribute. For example, if the network is not faster
than the slowest anonymisation service, all systems would look the same. There
is no influence if the local area netwok offers better performance than the fastest
system at all times.
The basic idea to estimate the possible influence of the network (DIRECT)
is to analyse all single test cases of all tested systems for this possible influence.
We call the ratio of the number of all cases with a non-negligible influence to the
total number of cases critical influence ratio. If this ratio is, for a scenario, higher
than 5%, we call the influence of the network on the scenario non-negligible.
Otherwise, we assume that there is no influence of the network on this scenario.
To calculate a level of non-negligibility, we suggest to evaluate all test cases
by their throughput, separately for each scenario, by the formula presented in
figure 2. This approach basically calculates the difference between the through-
put measured for the network at a given hour and the throughput of a given
test case in this hour. As a measure for the standard deviation of the network’s
bandwidth, we also provide the interquartile range for its througput. We sub-
tract half of its value, as only the diminishment of the network’s bandwidth is
critical, and call the resulting value critical throughput for this test case. If the
critical throughput is greater than zero, we assume a low possibility for network
interference. Otherwise, the network influence is assumed to be non-negligible
for this test case. As shown in table 8 (critical throughput influence ratio), we
found a non-negligible network influence for 5 out of 12 scenarios. This means
that care must be taken when these scenarios are analysed, as at least some
clipping phenomena9 are expected.
9 Clipping means that some performance curves will have a hard break in the peaks.
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Varying performance throughout the day. An anonymity service saturated
with a big and distributed user group is expected to show a normal distribution
in user numbers, bandwidth and latency for each hour and day. In reality, though,
the user groups may be heterogenous and therefore have a strong influence on
performance over time. Before statistically analysing and comparing services, it
is therefore useful to exploratively identify time-dependend trends in the user
behaviour.
During the performance evaluation we retrieved the real-time number of con-
current users provided by the AN.ON services for further analysis. We identified
two major trends:
1. The user numbers seem to follow a sinusoidal curve with vertex at 11 a.m.
(cf. figure 5). Given that most users of AN.ON are located in Europe [8],
this means that the majority of them is using the service during the day and
not during the night.
2. The variables throughput and delay seem to be normally distributed between
1 p.m. and 9 p.m. Therefore, the influence of varying loads on the AN.ON
services is expected to be minimal in that time period.
Therefore, we decided to introduce a new scenario parameter daytime to sim-
plify the comparison of AN.ON with Tor, which is more equally distributed over
the whole day. daytime has the values morning (M) and afternoon (A), defined
as the hour-of-day intervals 1-9 a.m. and 1-9 p.m. (Berlin local time). All test
data from the remaining time periods was discarded.
4 Statistical Methodology for Analysis and Comparison
For distinguishing differences in our sample from “random noise”, we performed
thorough statistical analyses. This section provides a short explanation of the
statistical background needed to understand the results presented in section 5.
4.1 t-tests
In order to compare two samples, we use Student’s t-test, which is very robust
against violations of the normality assumption. In this paper we will use t-tests
to compare the mean value of a given parameter (i. e., throughput or delay) of
two samples (i. e., two anonymisation services). The t-test checks whether the
means of the tested parameters differ significantly (hypothesis H1).
t-tests can only be applied under the following assumptions [16]:
1. normal distribution of data
2. homogeneity of variances
3. independent, randomly selected samples
The last assumption is already addressed by the data quality measures men-
tioned in section 3.3. As we cannot expect the data in our samples to be normally
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distributed, we employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. If the result of this test is
significant, the data of the sample is not normally distributed and the t-test may
draw incorrect conclusions. Similarly, the equality of the variances is proven with
the Levene test. Even if the Levene test shows significantly differing standard
deviations, the t-test can still be applied. In this case a modified version of the
t-test has to be applied, though.
In the following sections the results of the the t-tests are shown in the column
labelled “Sides”. The higher the number of asterisks (*, **, ***), the more sig-
nificant is the evaluated difference of mean values. A dash (-) indicates that the
test found no significant difference (e. g. table 3).
4.2 Regression Analysis
We analyse possible correlations of two or more metric parameters by a Linear
Regression Analysis. It tests the assumption of a linear correlation between the
dependend parameter yi and the independent parameters xi of the form
yˆi = b0 +
m∑
j=1
bjxij
for all test cases i = 1, 2, . . . , n and the independent parameters j = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
In the following sections the confidence in the regression analysis is shown in the
row labelled “Terms”. The higher the number of asterisks (*, **, ***), the more
significant is the estimated influence of the parameter (cf. table 6).
In order to be able to perform a regression analysis, the basic assumptions of
linearity, independence, homoscedasticity and normality must be fulfilled for the
data [7].
5 Evaluation
As mentioned earlier we decided to split the gathered data points into two data
sets according to the time of day. The graphs in figures 5 and 6 show that
user numbers, delay, and throughput follow a typical course for the two AN.ON
services: between 1 p.m. and 9 p.m. the curves are approximately at the same
level, whereas they resemble a quadratic function with a minimum at about
5 a.m. between 1 a.m. and 9 a.m. For the comparison of the services, we focus
on the first of these periods which we call ‘afternoon’, as the AN.ON cascades
are obviously not under full load during the latter one – most users are asleep
during the ‘morning’ hours (cf. figure 6). Combining both the morning (M) and
afternoon (A) data of the AN.ON services and comparing that with the results
of Tor would unduly favor the AN.ON services, as Tor seems to be much less
dependent on daytime.
Anyway, splitting the samples offers another benefit: As described in section
4.1 t-tests operate under the assumption of normally distributed data.10 We
10 Following common practices we use logarithmically transformed values for this
purpose.
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found that within each of the two periods the samples are either normally dis-
tributed or closely resemble a normal distribution. This is not the case if the
samples include data of the whole day, though.
Note that we will only provide results on latencies for the WEB scenarios as
they are irrelevant for downloads.
5.1 Descriptive Statistics for DD, CCC and Tor
Descriptive statistics can provide some first hints regarding the characteristics
of a sample. Our results show that the evaluated systems differ in offered band-
width and latency. We suspect that the differences are partly due to varying loads
(amount of concurrent users) on the anonymisation services. In the rush hours
of the afternoon period, DD has very high user numbers (about 1,700 concurrent
users on average). In contrast, CCC, which had to be selected manually in order
to use it, is used by only 650 users on average. Figure 3 shows the mean values
of delay (a) and throughput (b) together with the observed standard deviations
for the individual services.
In terms of average delays, CCC offers best performance. The mean values
for DD and Tor are considerably worse, but they are too close together for a
meaningful graphical comparison. We will provide more concrete results utilising
t-tests in section 5.3 and 5.4.
On the other hand, Tor might outperform the AN.ON services in terms of
bandwidth. Due to the comparably high standard deviations a comparison with-
out thorough analysis is difficult, though. The AN.ON services tend to offer a
more constant QoS. From the user perspective, this may be an advantage, as
users might not be interested in performance peaks, but rather in adequate per-
formance every time they use the service.
TOR EN
TOR DE
CCC EN
CCC DE
DD EN
DD DE
 0  2000  4000  6000  8000
Delay [ms]
(a) Comparison of delay (A,WEB,EN)
TOR EN
TOR DE
CCC EN
CCC DE
DD EN
DD DE
 0  20  40  60  80  100
Throughput [KByte/s]
(b) Comparison of throughout
(A,DL,EN)
Fig. 3. Comparison of latency in the afternoon
5.2 Tor over Daytime
While performance differences between the morning and afternoon periods are
rather obvious for the AN.ON services (cf. figure 6), this is not that clearly visible
for Tor. As Tor has a global network of nodes and a distributed user base, this
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is very reasonable. Looking at the descriptive statistics, though, we found that
the mean values of delay and throughput differed a lot between the morning and
the afternoon period.
The results of the t-test suggest that there is indeed a difference between the
two time periods (cf. table 3 and statistical remarks). Local time may therefore
have a significant influence on local measurements, and Tor might not only prefer
nodes with the highest bandwidth as found in a recent study [4], but also the
nearest (low-latency) nodes. This may be due to an implicit attribute of its
implementation, although there is no sign of such a strategy in the source code.
If so, Tor’s practical anonymity would be affected: The difficulty of mounting a
collusion attack to capture the connections of specific local user groups would
be substantially reduced. Another reason for the observed pattern might be that
the initial assumption of a distributed user community is false. This is difficult
to prove, though, as the Tor network does not provide information about the
location and the number of its users. Accordingly, further research is needed to
explain our observations.
Table 3. Tor: Performance differences morning/afternoon
Scenario Means (exp) Kol.-Smir. T-Test Sides
Sim Lang Measure M A M A Levene T (df) 2 1
WEB DE Log(Delay) 3472 4097 - - 3.2(177) -2.3(177) * *
WEB EN Log(Delay) 3790 4231 - * 1.0(178) -1.8(178) - *
WEB DE Log(Thr) 8.7 6.3 * - 6.9(177)* 2.4(170) ** **
WEB EN Log(Thr) 5.9 4.9 - - 0.6(178) 2.1(178) * *
DL DE Log(Thr) 43.9 34.7 - - 0.0(176) 1.9(176) - *
DL EN Log(Thr) 45.7 39.1 - - 1.5(176) 1.6(176) - -
Significance codes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Remarks on statistical evaluation. According to the results (cf. rightmost
columns of table 3) we have to keep the null hypothesis for half of the scenarios.
On the other hand, according to the 1-sided11 t-test, all scenarios but {DL,EN}
are significant. As the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is only slightly significant in
only two cases, there is a high confidence in the correctness of the test result.
5.3 Comparison of Tor and DD in the Afternoon
The DD cascade is the common entry point to the AN.ON system for JAP
users. As there is (at the time of measurement) no automatic switching function
between different AN.ON cascades, most unexperienced users (who do not know
how to switch cascades) use the DD cascade. In terms of latency the statistical
11 If there is a good reason – not concluded from the collected data – that one of the
means should be higher or lower than the other one, the p-value (not shown in the
tables) of the t-test may be halved, as only one side of the test is of interest, and
the test returns a higher significance.
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results from table 4 show that there is little difference between DD and Tor in
the afternoon period. This may indicate that there is a tolerance level for this
kind of unexperienced users regarding latency of approximately 4 seconds. A
constant latency above this level seems to deter from using the system.12 This
supplements the results of [11] who found that there is a linear relation between
user numbers and latency by altering the internal delay of the DD service.
Remarks on statistical evaluation. Looking at table 4 we observe that DD
seems to have a slight advantage over Tor in regard to latency, but the difference
is only significant for the {WEB,EN} scenario. But then, Tor obviously offers
higher channel capacities by far (as shown by the {DL} scenarios) and thus
is able to outrun DD in the {WEB} scenarios. The significant difference in
bandwidth shows up in the {WEB,EN} scenario once again: Here, the difference
in bandwidth is not as clear as in the {WEB,DE} scenario however.
Table 4. Comparison of Tor and DD in the afternoon
Scenario Means (exp) Kol.-Smir. T-Test
Sim Lang Measure Tor DD Tor DD Levene T(df) Sig
WEB DE Log(Delay) 4032 3689 - ** 31.7(178)*** -0.3(131) -
WEB EN Log(Delay) 4238 3427 * * 19.4(178)*** 2.1(153) *
WEB DE Log(Thr) 6.30 4.30 - * 22.2(178)*** 3.8(140) ***
WEB EN Log(Thr) 4.92 3.75 - - 17.6(178)*** 2.7(150) **
DL DE Log(Thr) 34.71 10.31 - * 46.1(176)*** 7.7(119) ***
DL EN Log(Thr) 39.13 10.25 - *** 53.8(176)*** 6.7(122) ***
Significance codes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Units: throughput [KBytes/s], delay [msecs].
5.4 Comparison of Tor and CCC in the Afternoon
While the DD cascade is the default in AN.ON’s client software (JAP), the CCC
cascade has to be explicitly selected by the user. Obviously, most users stay with
the default (cf. figure 5). Consequently, this situation leads to lower latencies on
CCC than on DD. Nevertheless, compared to Tor the bandwith of the CCC
cascade is still lagging behind as shown in the {DL} scenarios in table 5. This
is true even for the German downloads, where CCC presumably has an implicit
advantage. Nevertheless, CCC outperforms Tor in the {WEB} scenarios, which
is quite interesting. Apparently, for web surfing extremely low latencies (CCC)
are more critical than sheer bandwith (Tor).
5.5 Correlations of User Numbers and Performance
In this section we will evaluate the influence of load on performance. AN.ON
cascades provide the number of concurrent users at a given time. We will use
12 Note that using the system and being connected to it are two different perspectives.
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Table 5. Comparison of Tor and CCC in the afternoon
Scenario Means (exp) Kol.-Smir. T-Test
Sim Lang Measure Tor CCC Tor CCC Levene T (df) Sig
WEB DE Log(Delay) 4032 1091 - - 98.4(178)*** 17.5(96) ***
WEB EN Log(Delay) 4238 1191 * - 91.2(178)*** 18.9(105) ***
WEB DE Log(Thr) 6.30 10.07 - - 25.0(178)*** -9.1(137) ***
WEB EN Log(Thr) 4.92 9.15 - - 23.3(178)*** -11.4(143) ***
DL DE Log(Thr) 34.71 21.40 - - 8.4(177)** 2.4(161) *
DL EN Log(Thr) 39.13 15.84 - ** 25.0(176)*** 4.3(142) ***
Significance codes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
Units: throughput [KBytes/s], delay [msecs].
this information to investigate the correlation between user number of both
AN.ON cascades and the performance parameters. We expect a strong positive
correlation between user numbers and latency and a strong negative correlation
between user numbers and throughput. Figure 4 shows this graphically in two
scatter plots.
The performance parameters have been scaled logarithmically as we expect
an exponential influence of the load. The correlation is especially explicit in the
selected morning period which contains data points with widely varying user
numbers, whereas the afternoon period consists of fairly uniform data that is
not suitable for further analysis.
The results of a regression analysis confirm the graphical observations. While
both cascades are similar in terms of delay, their characteristics differ a lot in
terms of throughput. Apparently, user numbers have a much greater effect on
the performance of CCC than on DD. This observation cannot be explained by
a gerenally inferior infrastructure (i. e., less capacity) of CCC, which still has
plenty of unused resources (cf. figure 3). Instead, we assume that users on DD
are considerably less active than those on CCC. A constant and inactive user
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Fig. 4. Influence of number of users on performance (M,WEB,DE,DD)
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Table 6. Regression model for performance and user numbers for language DE
Scenario
WEB DL
DD CCC DD CCC DD CCC
Param. (yˆi) Log(Delay) Log(Delay) Log(Thr) Log(Thr) Log(Thr) Log(Thr)
Terms
Const. (B0) 2.708*** 2.655*** 1.49*** 1.66*** 2.11*** 2.871***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Users 5.075*** 5.802*** -5.215*** -10.235*** -6.781*** -25.170***
Model
N 258 256 258 256 256 256
R2 0.612 0.522 0.623 0.626 0.631 0.774
F 404.2*** 277.1*** 422.8*** 426.0*** 433.4*** 870.8***
df 1/256 1/254 1/256 1/255 1/255 1/255
Significance codes: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 .
Standard errors in brackets (). Users: B1 ∗ 104.
base would correspond to the findings in [11] where still some hundred users
were counted on DD even when the service had been made unusably slow.
According to these findings raw user numbers are no suitable predictor for load
and expected performance on a cascade. We therefore suggest that AN.ON ser-
vices should only report the number of active users. Otherwise, users might be de-
ceived in terms of the provided anonymity, which is shown in JAP’s anonymeter.
As adjusted user numbers would correspond to the actual load they could serve
as suitable performance measure. Due to their different characteristics find-
ing a uniform regression model for multiple cascades can be a daunting task,
though.
Remarks on statistical evaluation. As we assume exponential correlations,
all performance parameters are transformed by log10. For the DE scenarios, we
could clearly identify normally distributed (transformed) residuals, while this
Table 7. Domains chosen from Alexa’s[2] top 20 and Downloads.de/.com top 200
Simulation Language Domains
WEB DE google.de spiegel.de amazon.de t-online.de msn.de mobile.de
leo.org freenet.de arcor.de heise.de
WEB EN yahoo.com msn.com google.com passport.net amazon.com
myspace.com microsoft.com bbc.co.uk aol.com blogger.com
go.com alibaba.com cnn.com craigslist.org
DL DE virenschutz.info gratisgames24.de neuesvon.de
DL EN morpheus.com freewarefiles.com macromedia.com
To minimize space requirements, the domains are listed here only, not the downloaded
files or the protocol identifier. Files were requested by HTTP only.
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Fig. 5. User behaviour in AN.ON cascades
is not the case for the EN scenarios, though. As shown in table 6 the expo-
nential correlation is highly significant and explains most of the spread of the
performance parameters (R2 > 0.5).
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Fig. 6. Graphical comparison of different anonymity services
6 Future Work
Maybe our methodology for collecting performance data can be further improved
concerning the robustness of the collected data. As measurements took place
always in the same interval, this might give rise to inherent biases due to repeated
network phenomena being in time with the test cycles. A simple solution might
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Table 8. Data quality measures (cf. section 3.3)
Simulation Web browsing Downloads
Language DE EN DE EN
Total test cases 258 258 258 258
30min overlap ratio 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
1h breaks 0 0 0 0
TOR 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.18
Critical throughput influence ratio DD 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.05
CCC 0.13 0.28 0.01 0.22
DIRECT 0 1 1 0
TOR 1 0 2 2
Missing test cases DD 0 1 2 0
CCC 0 0 1 0
ALL 1 2 6 2
Median received KBytes ALL 1274.65 997.1 1529.44 1759.69
IQR received KBytes ALL 73.64 56.50 82.00 0.00
HTTP Requests w/o failures 103130 79623 771 774
Error ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Failures DIRECT 0 0 0 0
Median received KBytes ratio 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
IQR received KBytes ratio 0.06 0.05 0.00 0.00
HTTP requests w/o failures 102199 79264 768 768
Error ratio 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02
Failures TOR 0 0 0 1
Median received KBytes ratio 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.00
IQR received KBytes ratio -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00
HTTP requests w/o failures 102236 79200 767 772
Error ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Failures DD 17 11 15 27
Median received KBytes ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IQR received KBytes ratio 0.06 0.17 0.00 0.00
HTTP requests w/o failures 102845 79876 771 774
Error ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09
Failures CCC 3 0 0 0
Median received KBytes ratio 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IQR received KBytes ratio -0.01 -0.13 0.00 ∞
involve randomly changing session time slots or delays (cf. section 3.3), e. g. using
a Poisson distribution as proposed in [13].
Moreover, extending the measured time frame would allow for interesting
long term analyses and could help the developer community to understand the
impact of newly introduced features. Besides, more AN.ON cascades with high
load should be investigated in order to confirm the findings about a user tolerance
level, and for building a common regression model for the cascade performance
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depending on user numbers. This will be more promising in the future, as AN.ON
now has a client-based load balancing, and may take this study as a reason for
only counting active users.
Finally, the time-dependent performance differences of Tor should be further
analysed.
7 Conclusion
Evaluating the performance of Tor and two AN.ON cascades, we have shown that
Tor, a large scale implementation of a free-route mixing protocol, is subject to
unpredictable performance, while AN.ON, implementing typically more central
mix cascades, is able to offer more consistent performance in general.
The suggestions of the Tor community regarding tuning the connection han-
dling policy of the web browser to mitigate Tor’s rather high network latencies
[19] are a reasonable approach. Anyway, the overall performance of Tor is already
sufficient for fast web surfing and downloads. The reason for the performance
differences between morning and afternoon periods remains unclear for now. If
Tor’s routing strategy was really lured into selecting close-by nodes, this would
have considerable implications for the anonymity provided.
In contrast, AN.ON’s advantage in latency is restrained by its limited band-
width and its lack of a load balancing mechanism. Apparently, the DD cascade of
AN.ON suffers from high loads (up to 2,000 concurrent users observed). There-
fore it cannot deliver satisfying performance during the busy afternoon period
where it behaves comparable to Tor regarding latency. The less frequently used
CCC cascade is able to offer low-latency web surfing, but at the price of a smaller
user base and therefore less anonymity.
An important finding is the supposed user tolerance level for latency: Tor,
as a distributed network with many entry points, may automatically adapt to
user expectations regarding latency, and therefore pick up as many users as
possible with the given network structure. Its performance is not expected to
suffer noticeably from single new users connecting to the system. AN.ON, on
the other hand, deters a lot of users by offering a single entry point for new
users right at the tolerance level, as the performance of this entry point is much
more affected by new users than that of Tor.
As this relativelyhigh latency seems tobe toleratedbymostprivacy-awareusers,
i. e., the ones using Tor or AN.ON, this level may serve as a foundation for a new
definition of low-latency in the context of anonymity services. Accordingly, this ob-
servation might be useful for designing new and more secure anonymity protocols.
Further experiments should verify this level and whether it changes over time.
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Appendix
The criteria for our choices of URLs were
– server performance much better than performance offered by anonymisation
service, so that the results are not biased by slow servers13
13 As we can never be sure that all servers have an adequate speed during the mea-
surement, we aggregate the download performance of a set of URLs to a test case in
order to mitigate possible influences.
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– comparable number of URLs and downloaded bytes within the same scenario
– low number of HTTP errors produced by the requested web servers
– average total download time for web sites plus downloads of one language is
much smaller than 30 minutes
– for web site URLs: plausibility of ranking in the Alexa top list
Geolocation detection. As stated in section 3.3, the separation of the EN/DE
scenarios might be jeopardised through geolocation of the client based on its IP
address. Geolocation is performed by the webserver in order to (1) provide a
localised version of a web site, or to (2) enhance the user-view performance by
redirecting the request to a “nearer” webserver.
Localised versions of web sites do not influence our tests unduly, because
latency and bandwidth are not affected. However, if requests are re-routed to
another server, this will change. We applied the following checks to check whether
any form of request re-routing took place:
– We utilised the Unix dig utility and examined the DNS records for the
individual hosts. We found multiple IPs and short TTLs, which indicates
that several sites employed round robin IP rotation. Typically, web sites
under high load use this approach for load balancing, but not for geolocation.
– We requested the individual URLs from our {EN} scenarios with the Unix
wget utility and looked for HTTP redirects, which the webserver might send
during geolocation: No URL used in the scenarios employed HTTP redirects
for their homepage.
